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In this review essay I offer a critical assessment of the work of David Byrne, an applied social scientist 
who is one of the leading advocates of the use of complexity theory in the social sciences and who has 
drawn on the principles of critical realism in developing an ontological position of ‘complex realism’. 
The key arguments of his latest book, Applying Social Science: The Role of Social Research in Politics, 
Policy and Practice constitute the frame of the review; however, since these overlap with those of his 
previous books, Interpreting Quantitative Data and Complexity Theory and the Social Sciences, I 
consider all three books together. I identify aspects of Byrne’s ontological position that are in tune with 
the principles of original and dialectical critical realism and aspects that are not. I argue that these 
inconsistencies, which Byrne must resolve if he is to take his understanding of complexity further, stem 
from the residual influence of various forms of irrealism in his thinking. 
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Introduction 
 
One of the more recent ‘turns’ to have taken place within the social sciences is that associated 
with the theory of complexity. As John Urry has observed, the origins of this turn lie in 
developments in the natural sciences going back three decades or so, with its emergence in 
the social sciences being marked by the conclusions of the report of the Gulbenkian 
Commission on the restructuring of the social sciences1 and the publication of edited 
collections on social science and complexity.2 As one might have expected, complexity theory 
has attracted the attention of applied social scientists, especially those concerned with public 
policy making.3 One of those applied social scientists is David Byrne, whose work should be 
of interest to critical realists given his declared aim of combining the insights of complexity 
theory and critical realism in the manner advocated by Michael Reed and David Harvey.4 This 
combination, which he calls an ontology of ‘complex realism’ (p. 21), is the basis on which he 
presents the arguments of his latest book Applying Social Science: The Role of Social Research 
                                                          
1 Gulbenkian Commission 1996, cited in Urry 2005, 2. 
2 Kiel and Elliott 1996 and Eve et al. 1997 cited in Urry 2005, 2. See also Bogg and Geyer 2007. 
3 See, for example, Haynes 2003, Geyer and Rihani 2010, and Room 2011. 
4 Reed and Harvey 1992. 
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in Politics, Policy and Practice, and which is the main object of the following critique. However, 
because Byrne refers in this book to arguments that he developed in previous work – most 
notably his critique of linear modelling in Interpreting Quantitative Data5 and the nature of 
complex social systems in Complexity Theory and the Social Sciences,6 I consider the 
arguments of all three books in my critique.  
 
In the first section I give a brief overview of some of the main themes and strengths of 
Applying Social Science as a prelude to a critical assessment of Byrne’s declared ontological 
position – that of ‘complex realism’ – in the second section, where I discuss four examples of 
theoretical inconsistency. I argue that these must be understood as the product of 
contradictions in Byrne’s thinking about the nature of reality, which reflect a tension between 
the influences of transcendental realism on the one hand and empirical and conceptual 
realism on the other.7 In the third section I consider Byrne’s understanding of the nature of 
science and challenge his claim that the distinction between pure and applied science is of 
little or no value. I argue that this claim reveals the influence of pragmatism and 
interpretivism in his thinking, which contradicts his implicit commitment to (transcendental 
realist) critical naturalism. In the fourth section I turn to the issue of the production of 
knowledge. Here I call into question Byrne’s conception of applied science as 
‘postdisciplinary’, arguing that this overlooks the reality of the social and intellectual 
conditions for scientific activity (whether pure or applied) and contradicts his implicit 
recognition of the reality of these conditions in his critique of the UK’s Research Assessment 
Exercise and in his discussion of the relationship between applied social science and society. 
The common thread in my critique of Byrne’s conception of reality and of science is the finding 
that the contradictions and confusion in his thinking stem ultimately from the influence of 
(different forms of) irrealism. Therefore, my review may be seen as underlabouring for a more 
coherent theory of complexity – at least with respect to Byrne’s work – and as indicating the 
need for him to resolve the contradictions in his thinking before elaborating further on the 
nature of a complex realist (social) ontology.  
 
 
1. Overview 
 
In Applying Social Science David Byrne is concerned, not so much with elaborating on the 
nature of applied social science and how it differs from that of pure social science, but with 
how it is produced, how it informs so-called evidence-based policy making, and how it is 
(mis)used by politicians and policy makers. What explains this particular take on applied social 
science is the ultimate objective of Byrne’s argument, which is to re-define applied social 
science: to move from a definition that focuses on application of the results of pure (or 
abstract) social science to a definition that emphasizes the ways in which knowledge of social 
reality ‘is actually constructed in the very process of active intervention in that world’ (p. 4) – 
a definition that challenges the traditional way of doing social science, premised as that is on 
a distinction between pure and applied work, where the ‘pure’ always comes before the 
                                                          
5 Byrne 2002. 
6 Byrne 1998. 
7 Note that I am following Bhaskar’s definitions of ‘transcendental realism’, ‘empirical realism’, and ‘conceptual 
realism’. See Bhaskar 1986/2009, 5–10. 
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‘applied’. In Byrne’s view ‘there is a serious question to be asked as to whether there is any 
value at all in a conception of pure/disciplinary sciences separate from application’ (p. 4). His 
answer to that question is that thinking of social research (at a fundamental level) as a social 
process precludes the possibility of making a valuable distinction between pure and applied 
science. In support of this answer, Byrne shows, through a plethora of examples – some 
drawn from his own experience of working as an applied social scientist – how the formation, 
implementation and evaluation of policy interventions in society plays an important part in 
the production of knowledge about society – a part that is often overlooked in standard 
textbooks on social research. In this respect his selection and discussion of examples of 
various social policy interventions, such as urban development and employment programmes 
in chapter four, is one of the strengths of the book.  
 
Byrne’s critical exploration of the relationships between the work of social researchers 
(whether they are based inside or outside the academy) and the work of non-academic 
professionals (such as social workers and urban planners) and policy makers (in local and 
central government) is another strength of the book. Across the main part, from chapters two 
to nine, Byrne evaluates continually the nature of much applied social research and points to 
the explanatory (in)adequacy of that which is positivist-inspired. Indeed, he states explicitly 
that he wants to encourage the production of ‘good applied social research’, where by ‘good’ 
he means, first, ‘useful empirical knowledge about social reality’ that is respectful of ‘past, 
present and potential futures’ and, second, ‘truthful accounts of reality’ that can inform 
democratic ‘processes of governance’ (p. 6). He is also critical of the use of applied social 
research as ‘policy-based evidence’, by which he means ‘the selective use of research findings 
to assert that policies have worked, continue to work, and will work in the future’ (p. 5); and, 
building on this point via the work of Colin Crouch,8 is critical of the way in which much applied 
social science is fuelling the emergence of a ‘post-democratic’ society – a society imbued with 
an ‘ideological consensus’ among governing elites about ‘the relationship between state and 
market’ and ‘the subordination of politics to business interests’, with the result that 
competition between major political parties is reduced to the issue of ‘technical and 
managerial efficiency’ – of who is best equipped to deliver the fruits of capitalism (pp. 7 – 8).  
 
Of course, in criticizing politicians’ and policy makers’ misuse of evidence from evaluation 
studies Byrne exposes the characteristically covert ideological agenda of policy-making elites 
– that is, the legitimization of policies favourable to dominant, private-sector interests. As he 
makes clear in chapter six, where he discusses the relationship between social science and 
public consultation, social scientists indirectly (and, I would add, typically unintentionally) 
support covert exercises in policy legitimation through, for example, generating survey data 
that inform ‘processes of target setting and measurement’ and through designing ‘modes of 
quantitative engagement’ such as public focus groups. The ‘rhetoric of empowerment’ that 
usually accompanies such exercises ensures that they neutralize public opposition and 
thereby work against the establishment of effective democratic forms of governance in which 
policy making starts not from the top down but from the bottom up – with the concerns and 
interests of those in the subordinated majority in society (pp. 135–7). At least in being explicit 
about his own ideological position – a position rooted in the principles of ‘radical and 
                                                          
8 Crouch 2000. 
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solidaristic egalitarianism’ – Byrne cannot be accused of attempting to conceal an ideological 
agenda (p. 6).  
 
 
2. Theoretical inconsistencies 
 
In committing himself to a politics of emancipatory social transformation guided by a critical 
social science, Byrne is clearly working in sympathy with the ethical orientation of critical 
realist philosophy – that of eudaimonia. However, at various points in Applying Social Science 
Byrne appears to be out of step with the principles of critical realism and appears to show a 
lack of concern with elaborating a (transcendental) realist social ontology. Byrne declares his 
meta-theoretical position to be that of ‘complex realism’, which he describes as a ‘synthesis’ 
of critical realism and complexity theory (p. 20). Now, if that is the case, complex realism is 
first and foremost a particular ontological position entailing a particular epistemological and 
methodological position. Yet Byrne rarely, if at all, makes clear the epistemological and 
methodological principles that follow from a complex realist social ontology, despite telling 
us in the introduction to the book that ‘Chapter One will address “the methodological 
foundations of applied social science”’ (p. 8). In the first chapter Byrne focuses on ontology 
rather than methodology and mainly on the ‘complex’ part of complex realism when outlining 
the differences between ‘the simple, the restricted complex, and the general complex’ (p. 26). 
He admits to setting out ‘in brutal summary the essentials of critical realism’ (p. 21); but many 
critical realists will find his summary a little too ‘brutal’ – even superficial – and somewhat 
misleading. Granted, Byrne does give a plausible account of the principle of multiple causal 
determination, replete with examples from science; but his account would have been 
stronger if he had referred explicitly to the concepts of vertical and horizontal ontological 
depth (entailing the stratification and differentiation of reality). Moreover, his account of the 
three domains of reality – the real, the actual and the empirical (now expanded to the 
subjective) – fails to make clear that these are overlapping domains such that the empirical is 
a subset of the actual, which, in turn, is a subset of the real. He makes this mistake in 
Complexity Theory and the Social Sciences where he writes: 
 
It has to be said that Bhaskar uses the term ‘real’ in a more restrictive sense than that applied here, 
and that there is some value in his usage. For him the term ‘real’ should be reserved for the complex 
and contingent causal mechanisms and the entities which compose them … The events which 
happen in the world are actual. Those things which we experience are empirical.9 
 
However, in failing to acknowledge that the three domains of reality are overlapping subsets 
Byrne is the one who is placing an unwarranted restriction on the domain of the real – not 
Bhaskar. In Applying Social Science Byrne develops further his account of the three domains 
and tells us that ‘[t]he third level is the level of the knowledge we construct about the actual 
and the real, the level of the empirical’ (pp. 21-2). Yet, one of the basic principles of critical 
realism is that the production of knowledge pertains to the transitive dimension of science 
and is not synonymous with ‘the level of the knowledge we construct about the actual and 
the real’, as Byrne thinks, because the knowledge we produce about reality encompasses all 
three domains – the real, the actual and the subjective.  
 
                                                          
9 Byrne 1998, 37–8. 
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Byrne’s misunderstanding of the relationship between the three domains of reality in critical 
realism is symptomatic, I suggest, of the residual influence of irrealism, which generates 
inconsistencies in his understanding of the nature of social science. Let me discuss four 
examples of this. The first comes from Byrne’s discussion of the nature of measurement in 
social science. Byrne is quite clearly critical of the traditional understanding of statistical 
modelling in social science, where identified relationships between empirical variables – the 
brute facts of positivist social science – are (implicitly) treated as defining of social reality. He 
says of this type of modelling: 
 
It remains predominantly linear, trapped in a view of causality which defines effects as incremental 
changes in disembodied continuous variables rather than state changes in whole systems, and too 
often fails to recognise that modelling of complex and emergent social reality is not a second-class 
substitute for experimental approaches to a seldom available simplicity. (p. 146) 
 
It is the reification of variables that is the focus of Byrne’s critique of positivist-inspired 
statistical modelling – a critique he develops at length in Interpreting Quantitative Data where 
he argues that ‘the things we can measure are not “variables” but traces – the expression of 
the real systems that compose the world’.10 To put this another way, the ‘traces’ of reality 
that we detect through statistical measurement are the effects of a complex conjunction of 
generative mechanisms, so that to explain such effects we must refer to the existence of real 
entities, such as social structures and social systems, having distinctive causal powers, 
liabilities, propensities, and so forth. Byrne acknowledges this too: 
 
From the traces we can reconstruct a version of the real entities and of the relationships among 
those entities and of the emergent forms which are the product of and producers of the 
relationships among those entities. We can glimpse the entities and the systemic relationships 
among the entities.11 
 
However, the last sentence of the above quotation is problematic because the idea of 
glimpsing entities suggests that we can observe or measure them, and so acquire knowledge 
of them, directly. For example, during his discussion of the nature of measurement in chapter 
two of Interpreting Quantitative Data Byrne distinguishes between ‘two types of traces that 
can be measured’, telling us that ‘[o]ne type is a trace of the system that constitutes our case, 
whether that system is an individual, household, city, nation, bloc or whatever’.12 But just 
before this part of the discussion he tells us that ‘what we measure are the systems/cases’ 
and that in order to ‘avoid reifying “variables” and abstracting from real systems/cases, then 
we have to measure the systems/cases’.13 Now, if our case is an individual person – and Byrne 
does use a person as an example of a case in his explication of ‘polythetic classification’14 – 
we will be dealing with a highly complex, concrete entity – a ‘laminated system’ as Collier has 
it.15 Yet, it is because people constitute complex physical, chemical and biological systems 
that we cannot acquire knowledge of these systems directly through measurement; we can 
measure only the effects of these systems. Equally, in social research what we are measuring 
                                                          
10 Byrne 2002, 42. 
11 Byrne 2002, 36. 
12 Byrne 2002, 37. 
13 Byrne 2002, 36. 
14 Byrne 2002, 37. 
15 Collier 1989, 194. 
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or recording when we talk to people and observe their behaviour are the effects of social 
systems – not the systems in themselves. That Byrnes thinks we can measure, and so acquire 
knowledge of, causal objects directly – what I call the empirical fallacy – is testament, I 
suggest, to the residual influence of empiricism in his thinking about the nature of social 
science.  
 
The second example of theoretical inconsistency comes from Byrne’s discussion of ways of 
modelling the emergent complexity of social reality. In chapter seven of Applying Social 
Science he emphasizes repeatedly the lack of ‘interaction’ in standard linear regression 
models, telling us that ‘[i]nteraction terms which describe complex relationships among 
variables are seldom fitted and almost never interpreted’ (p. 143); that ‘[o]ther than in the all 
too seldom attention paid to interaction, conventional modelling cannot really handle 
complex causation’ (p. 46); and that 
 
all forms of model in relation to any kind of complex social process are superior to randomized 
controlled trials. This is because they all, even if only in the form of interaction terms inserted into 
regression equations, can make some sort of allowance for complexity and emergence. (p. 153)  
 
The problem, though, is that to model social reality either through simulating the ‘interaction’ 
of individual agents in ‘multi-agent models’ or through inserting ‘interaction terms’ into linear 
regression equations is to presuppose that complexity pertains only to the level of the actual 
and empirical.16  
 
Now, there may well be good reasons to describe patterns of events, whether those detected 
through standard statistical techniques or those produced artificially through computer 
simulation, as complex. However, in both Applying Social Science and Interpreting 
Quantitative Data Byrne treats complexity as an emergent property of reality and thereby 
implies that it is a characteristic of causal entities – specifically, the nature of the relationships 
between them.17 But, I suggest that, if it is the influence of transcendental realism that leads 
Byrne to an implicit understanding of the relationships between causal entities as complex, it 
is the residual influence of actualism and empirical realism in his thinking that undercuts that 
understanding and leads him to an explicit understanding of observed events and/or states 
of affairs as complex. It is only by postulating the existence of these two contradictory 
influences in his thinking that we can make sense of his comments that a ‘simulated complex 
system might be considered to represent a valid metaphor for a real complex system’18 and 
that ‘agent-based modelling … cannot deal with the Durkheimian social, with a social reality 
which has an existence over and beyond the elements within the system’ (p. 152). In both 
comments the influence of transcendental realism is undercut, and so distorted, by the 
                                                          
16 Byrne discusses computer simulation and loglinear techniques in chapter seven of Applying Social Science. 
17 In chapter two of Complexity Theory and the Social Sciences he writes: 
 
Chaos/complexity, because it is founded in a recognition of the non-linear character of reality, is absolutely 
concerned with the implications of local context expressed in terms of time and space. Chaos/complexity, 
because it recognizes the significance of emergent properties, asserts the emergent, distinctive and non-
reducible character of the social (Byrne 1998, 47). 
 
See also note 22, below. 
18 Byrne 2002, 138. 
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influence of irrealism, resulting in the (mis)representation of a complex system by an invalid 
metaphor in the former instance – a ‘simulated complex system’ – and the illicit reification of 
social reality in the latter – ‘the Durkheimian social’. 
 
The third example of theoretical inconsistency is Byrne’s ambivalent understanding of 
simplification in social science. On the one hand he recognizes implicitly that social scientists, 
by virtue of the nature of social objects, cannot intervene in social reality in order to isolate a 
particular causal mechanism. As he puts it, ‘In the domains to which we apply social science 
we are never working with the sort of simplicity which can be addressed by the bench-
controlled experiment’ (p. 30). (One might note in passing that he ought to acknowledge that 
conceptual abstraction – in this case, the analysis of complex social systems in thought – is 
still a possibility for social scientists.) On the other hand he appears to suggest that, because 
reality is so complex, the only way we can try to understand it is by producing a simplified 
model of it. As he puts it at the start of chapter seven of Applying Social Science, ‘So models 
are representations of the world but are necessarily simplified. Something has to be left out’ 
(p. 139). Similarly, when discussing the modelling of complexity in chapter one he tells us that 
‘we always simplify’ (p. 28). Now, we can agree with Byrne if by simplification he means the 
abstraction of an object of inquiry from its context. However, it is clear from his subsequent 
remarks that this is not what he means; rather, he understands simplification as a way of 
assuming away complexity so as to generate a model that has predictive power. However, in 
doing so Byrne assumes implicitly that what exists at the level of the actual and empirical is 
complex rather than what exists beyond these levels.  
 
Moreover, Byrne’s identification of the need for simplification is premised on a 
correspondence theory of truth so that simple theories are a direct reflection of simple 
objects and complex theories a direct reflection of complex objects.19 According to this way 
of thinking it is impossible for us to produce a complex theory of a complex object: therefore, 
we must simplify. However, as Lawson explains in his critique of similar arguments put 
forward by orthodox economic modellers, 
 
Such a conception is not sustainable … We can certainly express holistic entities, without knowingly 
fictionalising.… The point is that any discussion of such an explanatory causal process takes the 
form of words and symbols, etc. The complexity of an object is not inevitably mirrored in a similar 
form of complexity in the description of the object. Knowledge and its object are typically different 
types of ‘things’ with their own modes of being.20 
 
The implicit correspondence theory of truth in Byrne’s discussion of simplification in social 
science reveals, once more, the influence of empiricism in his thinking. Because this influence 
contradicts and so distorts the influence of transcendental realism, the combined effect of 
                                                          
19 Byrne defines the ‘necessary limitation of any scientific description’ of a complex system as follows: 
 
When we are dealing with the simple we can through reductionist techniques produce adequate models of 
systems and of causation which are simplifications of the things we are seeking to understand. We cannot 
do that with complex systems. An adequate description would have to be as complex as the system itself, 
which … is a major problem for the simulation of complex systems. (p. 28) 
 
20 Lawson 2003, 307. 
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these influences is such that Byrne falls into the trap of the epistemic–ontic fallacy and ends 
up understanding complexity as something immediately observable and describable.  
 
The fourth example of theoretical inconsistency comes from Byrne’s comments about the 
ontological status of ‘variables’. Now, as I have already indicated, Byrne is particularly 
concerned to reject the reification of scientific facts implicit in positivist-inspired approaches 
to statistical modelling, which presuppose that the events of the world are disembodied – 
that their existence is not be explained by any kind of underlying generative context. Byrne is 
quite explicit about this rejection, especially in the concluding chapter of Interpreting 
Quantitative Data, where he writes that he has been arguing against ‘the abstraction and 
reification of aspects of real complex systems from those systems and the consequent 
treatment of these reified abstractions as having real and independent causal powers’.21 
Indeed, in also arguing against ‘Analysis’, ‘Universalism’, ‘Linearity’, ‘Mathematical formalism’ 
and ‘Hypothesis fetishism’ it is clear that Byrne has the panoply of positivist assumptions 
about (social) science in his sights. Again, it seems to me that the influence of transcendental 
realism is clearly in evidence here, as it is in his summary of what he is arguing for – most 
notably, ‘Complexity’ and ‘Non-linearity’.22  
 
Yet, in arguing against the disembodiment of variables earlier on in Interpreting Quantitative 
Data, he ends up denying that they are real. In chapter two he writes: 
 
So, death to the variable – or rather let us understand clearly, once and for all, that variables don’t 
exist. They are not real. What exists are complex systems, which systems are nested, intersecting, 
which involve both the social and the natural, and which are subject to modification on the basis 
of human action, both individual and social.23 
 
The problem, though, is that in denying that variables are real Byrne is denying that ‘traces’ 
are real because he is simply replacing the concept of variables with that of traces. Recall that, 
in Byrne’s view ‘[v]ariables describe properties of cases but the real things are the cases, not 
the traces of them which we measure as variables’.24 However, if the traces of reality that we 
measure when we carry out statistical modelling are not real, how can we infer from them 
the existence of complex systems, which we must if we are to explain them without running 
into the atomistic and empirical fallacies? In other words, if we accept that reality is 
something more than just what can be measured – that it is characterized by vertical and 
horizontal ontological depth – we cannot deny the existence of events that conjunctions of 
causal mechanisms give rise to; for the events that we observe in the domain of the empirical 
                                                          
21 Byrne 2002, 162. He makes a similar claim in the first chapter of Applying Social Science where he writes: 
 
A complex realist take regards measurements as generally being not accounts of things real in themselves 
which can be abstracted from the complex systems they describe, the cases – the traditional understanding 
of variables – but rather as variate traces of the trajectory of those cases. (p. 32) 
 
22 Byrne 2002, 163. By ‘Complexity’ he means ‘understanding of the character of real complex systems in terms 
of wholes, parts, interaction of parts with parts, parts with wholes, and of systems with other systems in their 
environment, within which they are embedded, and which they contain’. By ‘Non-linearity’ he means 
‘recognition that the interesting and significant shifts in the trajectories and hence characters of complex 
systems are those that involve radical shifts of kind’ (Byrne 2002, 163). 
23 Byrne 2002, 31. 
24 Byrne 2002, 2. 
9 
 
are Byrne’s traces of reality and they are also the positivist’s variables. As such, they do not 
exist as reified entities – that is, in abstraction from the systems that generate them – but 
they are still real; and the concepts that we devise to describe them are also real.  
 
In this example Byrne commits the linguistic fallacy – that is, makes the mistake of assuming 
that the language we use to construct knowledge of social reality is defining, and so 
exhaustive, of social reality. Hence, in denying that variables exist, Byrne is supposing that a 
variable is not a concept through which we can know about an independently existing reality 
but is simply constitutive of reality. That is why Byrne can simply replace one concept, 
variables, with another, traces, and in the process re-define social reality. Yet, if both concepts 
are simply different ways of expressing the reality of an intransitive object, by denying that 
variables are real ipso facto Byrne is denying that traces are real. In short, Byrne’s thinking on 
this issue becomes trapped in a contradiction: between denying the intransitivity of the 
objects that variables and traces refer to on the one hand and accepting the intransitivity of 
complex systems on the other. This contradiction reflects, I suggest, the dual influence of 
transcendental and conceptual realism in his thinking.25 
 
If Byrne is to avoid the problem of theoretical inconsistency when reflecting on the nature of 
applied social science, he will need to clarify his understanding of the principles of critical 
realism before developing further the ontology of complex realism. At the very least he needs 
to avoid collapsing the domain of the real into the actual (actualism) and into the empirical 
(empirical realism), on the one hand, and avoid treating these three domains as mutually 
exclusive, on the other. He also needs to avoid collapsing the intransitive into the transitive 
dimension of science because, as I have argued elsewhere,26 ultimately it is the failure to 
sustain a notion of intransitivity that makes it impossible to make sense of the differentiation 
and interconnection of reality. Without sustaining the idea of existential independence,27 it 
becomes impossible to think about vertical and horizontal ontological depth, which is the 
condition of possibility for differentiation and integration in science and which Byrne 
                                                          
25 Note that Byrne explicitly rejects the epistemological position of strong social constructionism and the 
ontological position of conceptual realism (which it presupposes): 
 
The realist position, which is the foundation of the complex realism argued for here, certainly allows for 
knowledge to be contextual – limited in the scope of its application – and relative, in the sense that it is 
related to that context and the way in which researchers work in that context. However, the subjective 
element, while present in realism, is confined to the requirements that those producing knowledge should 
be aware of their own subjectivity and explain how this relates to the character of the knowledge generated. 
It is perfectly possible to have a social constructionist understanding in a realist frame. Indeed it is essential. 
What realism does not accept is that social construction in the sense of the construction in the research 
process is the only element in the construction of knowledge. Reality itself has a voice. (p. 43) 
 
26 See Holland 2013, ch. 2. 
27 Our attempt to express the truth of independently existing objects presupposes the possibility of referential 
detachment, which Bhaskar defines as ‘[t]he detachment of the act of reference from that to which it refers. 
This establishes at once its existential intransitivity and the possibility of another reference to it, a condition of 
any intelligible discourse at all’ (Bhaskar 1993/2008: 402–3). Byrne, though, comes very close to denying the 
possibility of referential detachment when he writes that ‘[i]t matters enormously that we are not in any real 
sense external observers. We are actually part of the systems themselves’ (p. 28). As social scientists we are part 
of social reality, of course, but that does not mean that in the process of scientific inquiry we cannot ‘detach’ 
ourselves from our object of study and thereby reflect on what we normally take for granted when we are not 
acting as social scientists. 
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implicitly accepts in characterizing complex systems as involving ‘both the social and 
natural’.28 
 
Moreover, I suggest that, at the same time as clarifying his understanding of the principles of 
critical realism, Byrne would do well to reflect on the nature of the entities that make up 
complex social systems and how these entities, as parts, are related to each other and to the 
system – the whole – that emerges from these relationships. I make this suggestion because 
often Byrne fails to make clear exactly what the components of a complex system are. For 
example, in chapter six of Complexity Theory and the Social Sciences, where he discusses ‘The 
Complex Character of Health and Illness’, he does not tell us exactly what the social 
determinants of the spread of tuberculosis in Britain in the nineteenth century were – by 
which I mean which particular social structures and systems were the underlying conditions 
for the rapid spread of the disease. He refers generally to material poverty and inequality but 
still we are left wondering what were the social relations and causal mechanisms that made 
these material outcomes possible. Perhaps we should look to the influence of the capitalist 
system of production and appropriation for part of the answer. However, Byrne appears 
interested in discussing only the spatial aspect of the spread of tuberculosis and in the process 
comes close to reducing a social system to its spatial aspect when he writes: ‘Here we have 
four systems in a nested hierarchy. The individual, the household, the community and the 
nation state.’29 Yet, although social systems do extend through space (and time), they cannot 
be reduced to a spatial arrangement. Therefore, without a clear understanding of the nature 
of social structures and systems and how they are related to biological structures and systems 
(such as the TB bacillus, human genes and the human immune system), it becomes difficult 
to understand just what Byrne is referring to when he writes of ‘interactive effects’.30 To put 
it bluntly, what is interacting with what and how? 
 
Having elaborated on the nature of a complex realist (social) ontology, Byrne might then turn 
to the epistemological and methodological implications of this – as he originally intended – 
and, in doing so, clarify the exact relationship between ontology, epistemology and 
methodology. So, at the level of epistemology, a complex realist ontology – if it is to be 
consistent with a critical realist ontology – ought to entail, at the very least, the principles of 
epistemic relativism and fallibilism (and as subject to judgmental rationality);31 and, at the 
level of methodology, the principle of unity-in-diversity, which expresses both the essential 
                                                          
28 Byrne 2002, 31. 
29 Byrne 1998, 111. 
30 Byrne 1998, 111. 
31 Granted, Byrne does acknowledge the principle of epistemic relativism: see the quotation from chapter two 
of Applying Social Science in note 25, above. However, it is far from clear that Byrne also accepts a position of 
fallibilism, for he repeatedly asserts that complex realism is foundationalist. This tendency is especially 
prominent in his earlier work where he tells us that ‘[c]omplex accounts are foundationalist, although they are 
absolutely not reductionist and positivist’ (Byrne 1998, 35); that ‘thinking in terms of society as constituted as a 
dissipative and evolutionary system … is inherently foundationalist’; and that ‘[t]he combination of the 
philosophical ontology of critical realism and the scientific ontology of chaos/complexity constitutes a very 
general, indeed absolute, claim about the nature of scientific understanding and the character of scientific 
investigation’ (Byrne 1998, 46 – 7). Now, we could accept the characterization of the epistemological position 
of critical realism as ‘foundationalist’ if and only if it meant knowledge that is grounded in reality. However, 
Byrne’s implied reference to epistemological absolutism suggests that he is thinking of foundationalism – if only 
implicitly – as certainty and incorrigibility in our knowledge of reality, because epistemological absolutism is the 
dialectical counterpart of epistemological foundationalism. 
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logic of inquiry that applies across all sciences – retroduction (in pure science) and 
retrodiction (in applied science) – and the necessary differences in the methods of scientific 
inquiry stemming from differences in the nature of the objects of scientific inquiry. Indeed, in 
developing a methodological position specific to the social sciences, perhaps Byrne might 
examine the concept of ‘critical methodological pluralism’,32 which would help him to 
understand how to overcome the long-standing dichotomy between quantitative and 
qualitative research – an objective that is the subject of the section ‘Beyond quantity versus 
quality’ in chapter one of Applying Social Science. Byrne concludes this section with the 
comment that ‘the dominant tradition in quantitative causal work, regression analysis and its 
derivatives, is not compatible with a proper understanding of causality in relation to complex 
systems but systematic comparison integrating qualitative and quantitative reasoning is’ (p. 
33). The problem here is that Byrne does not show how qualitative and quantitative 
‘reasoning’ can be integrated; rather, he makes the (valid) point that both qualitative and 
quantitative research depends on interpretation – hence his claim that ‘[t]here is no meta-
theoretical difference between the products of quantitative and qualitative social research’ 
(p. 33). But, as I have argued elsewhere, the categories of critical realism do offer us a way of 
overcoming the dichotomy between the quantitative and qualitative research paradigms and 
thereby of solving a problem that mixed-methods researchers have raised – that is, how to 
make sense of apparently contradictory empirical outcomes arising from the use of both 
quantitative and qualitative modes of inquiry.33   
 
 
3. Pure and applied social science 
 
Let me now turn to the question of whether or not we should make a distinction between 
pure, abstract or theoretical science and applied, concrete or practical science. One of the 
conclusions that Byrne draws from his consideration of the nature of contemporary social 
research is that this distinction is no longer of any value. Taking his cue from definitions of 
‘Science’, ‘Applied’, ‘Applied science’ and ‘Social science’ as found in the Oxford English 
Dictionary and Wikipedia, he informs us: 
 
This book will challenge the ordering of ‘pure’ or discipline-based science and applied science.… it 
will argue that much and perhaps most of the useful knowledge about the social world is actually 
constructed in the very process of active intervention in that world … Pure/disciplinary science 
does not come first. Indeed in relation to the essentially social, there is a serious question to be 
asked as to whether there is any value at all in a conception of pure/disciplinary sciences separate 
from application. (p. 4) 
 
Yet, we can recognize that knowledge of social reality is produced through practical 
engagement with social reality and also recognize the value of distinguishing between pure 
and applied social science. The basis for this dual recognition is of course the nature of reality. 
If this is characterized by vertical and horizontal ontological depth – that is, if it is structured, 
stratified and differentiated – events and states of affairs must be understood as subject to 
‘multiple determination’ – that is, produced by a multiplicity of causal mechanisms lying at 
                                                          
32 Danermark et al. 2002, 153. 
33 See Holland 2013, ch. 2. 
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different levels of reality.34 Pure, abstract or theoretical science, therefore, is necessary in 
order to identify different types of structure and their ways of working – the generative 
mechanisms set in motion when the causal powers, liabilities, and propensities pertaining to 
structures are triggered. Bhaskar has set out the sequence of processes defining this type of 
science. ‘Theoretical explanations’, he writes, 
 
are analogical–retroductive, exhibiting what I shall label the DREI schema: i.e. description of law-
like behaviour; retroduction, exploiting analogies with already known phenomena, to possible 
explanations of the behaviour; elaboration and elimination of alternative explanations; issuing 
(ideally) in the empirically-controlled identification of the causal mechanisms(s) at work.35 
 
In theoretical social science, then, our goal is to identify different types of social structure and 
thereby to produce a classification of the social order – a social scientific ontology. In doing 
so we move backwards – that is, we follow a ‘retroductive’ logic – from description of some 
significant pattern of events – a causal law – to the mechanism and hence structure 
responsible for producing it. Hence, in our theoretical work we are dealing with causal objects 
in the abstract: that is, we are trying to understand how a particular type of structure would 
work if its causal powers, liabilities, and propensities were triggered in isolation of the effects 
of other types of structure.36 Of course, owing to the nature of social objects of inquiry – viz. 
the fact that they depend on people – we cannot isolate the effects of individual social 
structures and so test our theories about them in an experiment; hence, we have to produce 
explanations of social phenomena entirely in thought and assess their validity not according 
to their predictive power but according to their relative explanatory power.  
 
By contrast, applied, concrete, or practical science is necessary if we are to understand which 
of the various structures and mechanisms that we have identified through our theoretical 
work are responsible for generating particular events and states of affairs of interest. In this 
type of scientific work our concern is to understand how a conjuncture of causal mechanisms 
is articulated and differentially weighted; that is, our concern is to understand the nature of 
the relationships between the component structures and how these relationships modify the 
effects of the component structures when their causal powers are triggered. Indeed, to the 
extent that the relationships between the component structures are internal as well as 
external and contradictory, so that there is a constant tendency towards change, the 
conjuncture must be described as a ‘partial totality’ and as exhibiting ‘holistic causality’.37 
Now, because we could never have deduced the outcome of this complex interplay of causal 
mechanisms from knowledge of how each structure works in isolation, we must employ a 
different sort of inquiry – practical or applied inquiry – that takes us from the abstract back 
towards the concrete. Bhaskar defines the logic of practical scientific inquiry as follows.  
 
Practical explanations, i.e. explanations of particular concrete phenomena, are especially tailored 
to open systems, the normal condition of things. They are decompository–retrodictive in structure, 
                                                          
34 Bhaskar 1993/2008, 82–3. 
35 Bhaskar 1986/2009, 68. 
36 As Bhaskar puts it, in pure scientific work we are concerned primarily with ‘elaborating the implications of the 
structure, empirically identifying and confirming its nature and properties, developing the explanatory-
taxonomic niche into which the structure fits, etc.’ (Bhaskar 1986/2009, 214). 
37 On the nature of ‘totality’ and ‘holistic causality’ see Bhaskar 1993/2008, 126–7. See also the discussion of 
these concepts in Norrie 2010, 90 – 6. 
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exhibiting the RRRE schema: viz. resolution of a complex event (situation, etc.) into its components; 
redescription of these components in theoretically significant terms; retrodiction, via 
independently validated normic or tendency statements, to possible antecedents of the 
components; and elimination of alternative possible causes.38 
 
Practical or applied explanation is ‘decompository’ because we ‘decompose’ an event or state 
of affairs into its antecedent causes through analysis, and, through synthesis, we show how 
the antecedent causes combine to generate the event or state of affairs of interest (the 
explanandum). Thus, we are not identifying previously unknown causes; rather, we are 
deciding which known causes are relevant to the situation of interest – a logic of retrodiction.  
 
Now, if in practical or applied explanation we draw on pre-existing knowledge of causal 
mechanisms, it follows that abstract or theoretical work is the pre-condition for applied or 
practical work. Therefore, it is in this sense that we can say that pure science ‘comes first’. 
However, this does not preclude the possibility that in the course of investigating a concrete 
phenomenon we will move back and forth between pure and applied modes of inquiry in a 
dialectic of the abstract and concrete. As social scientists we tend to employ both modes of 
inquiry when addressing concrete problems because it often happens that, in the course of 
applying pre-existing knowledge of causal mechanisms in relation to empirical evidence, we 
have to revise our understanding of those mechanisms in order to construct an adequate 
explanation of the particular event in question.39 Yet, although we do tend to employ both 
theoretical and applied modes of inquiry within the same investigation, this does not mean 
that we should not make a clear distinction between the two; for such a distinction is valuable 
if it helps us to avoid the dangers of theoretical reductionism and ontological actualism – that 
is, of supposing that the effects of the causal mechanism that we have understood through 
abstraction are always actualized. In other words, recognizing that pure and applied modes 
of inquiry are distinct from, yet related to, one another helps us to avoid engaging in ‘four 
modes of illicit abstraction, viz. destratification, deprocessualization, demediation and 
desingularization’,40 and so helps us to comprehend both the differentiation and 
interconnection of reality. 
 
If it is the nature of reality, ultimately, that licenses a distinction between pure and applied 
modes of scientific inquiry, does Byrne’s claim that ‘much and perhaps most of the useful 
knowledge about the social world is actually constructed in the very process of active 
intervention in that world’ call into question this distinction? What his claim alludes to, I 
suggest, is the relationship between theory and practice. Now, when policy makers intervene 
in social reality in order to change it – which is what Byrne appears to be alluding to by the 
phrase ‘process of active intervention in that world’ – they are engaging in a particular kind 
of practice, and they will develop practical explanations in line with the (scientific) theory 
informing the design of the policy intervention. But, if we accept, as critical realists do, that 
all theory is fallible, we should not be surprised to find that policy makers’ expectations are 
                                                          
38 Bhaskar 1986/2009, 68. 
39 Bhaskar appears to have recognized as much when he revised his model of applied explanation to include an 
‘I’ and a ‘C’, where the ‘I’ stands for the identification of ‘a full enough set (which may comprise a totality) of 
causes for a concrete applied explanation to be said to have been provided’ and the ‘C’ stands for ‘correction’ – 
so that we have the extended acronym RRREI(C). See Bhaskar 1993/2008, 133. 
40 Bhaskar 1993/2008, 130. These errors fall under the problem of the ‘fallacy of misplaced concreteness’. See 
the entry ‘concrete/abstract’ in Hartwig 2007, 71 – 3.  
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often confounded by people’s experiences following the implementation of the policy. 
Ideally, any inconsistency between expectations and actual results should lead us to revise 
the theory that informed the intervention; the revised theory should, in turn, become the 
basis for a new policy of intervention so that we have a process of dialectical reasoning in 
which theory informs practice and practice informs theory.  
 
The duality of theory and practice is a relationship that is distinct from (although related to) 
the relationship between pure and applied science. The two relationships are distinct because 
applied scientific inquiry is a mode of explaining particular events and states of affairs by 
means of antecedently established knowledge of reality (normic statements) and is thus 
defined in relation to pure scientific inquiry, whereas practice in relation to theory refers to 
human activity in general – to the power of human agency (or intentional transformative 
praxis) in exercise. Indeed, if we see pure and applied scientific inquiry as different types of 
practice, and as both (explicitly) informed by (philosophical and social scientific) theory and 
(implicitly) presupposing such a theory, we can see the relationship between pure and applied 
scientific activity as constellationally contained within practice. The value of the distinction 
between pure and applied science, though, is that it helps us to locate the sources of error in 
the process of producing knowledge and thereby helps us to find a way of reducing the degree 
of inconsistency between theoretically-informed practical expectations and actual, practical 
experiences. In claiming that the construction of knowledge via practical engagement with 
reality invalidates the distinction between pure and applied social science, therefore, Byrne 
appears to be denying the possibility of vertical and horizontal ontological depth – a denial 
that may well be the result of the influence of pragmatism and interpretivism in his thinking.41 
 
Let me discuss one particular theory–practice inconsistency as a way of clarifying the 
preceding argument. Suppose a social scientist noticed that higher education policy makers’ 
expectation that establishing independent interdisciplinary research institutes and centres 
would facilitate the production of genuinely integrative research had not been realized in 
practice. The social scientist, having examined critically the theory presupposed by such a 
policy, might conclude that it was inadequate to the extent that it reflected an erroneous 
positivist understanding of knowledge and of the production of knowledge – an 
understanding of science as a purely individualized process involving the recording of 
constantly conjoined, naturally-given facts. With this critique in mind the social scientist might 
argue that, in effect, policies intended to facilitate the production of integrative, 
interdisciplinary research assume (erroneously) that, if scientific specialists collect specialized 
facts (political, economic, sociological, geographical, and so forth), interdisciplinary science 
will be a matter of bringing together individual specialists, who will identify regular, empirical 
relationships between different types of facts. Turning to the distinction between pure and 
applied social science, the social scientist might show how this implicit and inadequate 
                                                          
41 Byrne discusses the philosophy of pragmatism in chapter eight on action research and appears to be critical 
of it: ‘The problem is that the pragmatic turn is a turn away from any kind of non-contextual knowledge, however 
limited the bounding of application of that knowledge. We lose structure when we take this turn’ (p. 159). I 
suggest that it is in virtue of the influence of (transcendental realist) critical naturalism that Byrne recognizes 
the problems associated with the pragmatist position. Nevertheless, his questioning of the distinction between 
pure and applied scientific inquiry and his emphasis on the construction of knowledge of social reality through 
practical engagement with it – as opposed to the transformation of pre-existing cognitive resources through a 
process of dialectical reasoning – indicates the residual influence of pragmatism and interpretivism in his 
thinking. 
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conception of the social and intellectual basis for scientific research (whether 
monodisciplinary or interdisciplinary) reflected – through a misunderstanding of the nature 
of abstraction – a problem of pure social science; that is, the social scientist might show how 
a conception of scientists as simply individuals collecting facts in a regular fashion 
presupposes that the way of working of the social and intellectual context of knowledge 
production is always actualized. In other words, by re-situating the initial problem within a 
(dialectical) critical realist ontology and so remedying the faulty abstraction, the social 
scientist would be in a position to explain two important tendencies related to the initial 
problem: the tendency for scientists to produce specialized rather than integrative forms of 
knowledge and the tendency for scientists whose intention is to produce integrative forms of 
knowledge to do so relatively incoherently. From this explanation the social scientist might 
draw the following policy conclusion: that, in order to encourage the production of 
integrative, interdisciplinary research, higher education policy makers would need to (a) 
transform the social conditions of knowledge production by making it possible for scientists 
to pursue academic careers on the basis of the production of integrative as well as specialized 
forms of knowledge; and (b) transform the intellectual conditions of knowledge production 
by making transcendental realism the explicit basis for the education and training of 
scientists. If such policies were implemented, the social scientist might expect to detect a 
weakening of the tendency for scientists to produce specialized rather than integrative forms 
of knowledge and a weakening of the tendency for scientists to produce incoherent forms of 
knowledge intended to be integrative. The social scientist might try to detect such changes 
through quantitative investigation of the actual types of research that had been produced 
over a restricted period of time and through qualitative investigation of the philosophical 
coherence of any research outputs produced and proclaimed to be integrative forms of 
knowledge within the same time period.  
 
Now, if the social scientist’s practical expectations were confounded – that is, if the social 
scientist concluded on the basis of the empirical evaluation of the policy changes that the 
tendencies under examination had either retained the same strength or had weakened only 
marginally – the social scientist might re-visit the explanation that informed the policy 
intervention and identify possible sources of error. One source of error in the construction of 
the explanation might be the process of abstraction; another might be the process of 
concretion, through which the social scientist understands how the various social and 
intellectual structures identified through the process of abstraction fit together as systems or 
totalities. Perhaps the social scientist misunderstood the nature of the connections between 
the funding of scientific research, peer review of research proposals and outputs, academic 
employment, and the structure of scientific fields. Alternatively, the confounding of practical 
expectations might be the result of the (inadequate) design of the policy intervention, 
reflecting a fault in the way the policy maker translated general policy conclusions into 
specific policy proposals. Perhaps the policy maker overlooked the importance of 
transforming the intellectual as well as the social conditions of knowledge production with 
the result that the UK academic community still tended to misunderstand the nature and 
importance of scientific integration. Indeed, the social scientist and policy maker might 
conclude that they should work together closely in order to overcome both the problem with 
the construction of the explanation and the problem with the design of the policy 
intervention. As Danermark argues, the relationship between scientist and policy maker ‘must 
be a reciprocal learning process’ in which the scientist helps the policy maker to understand 
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the causal complexity of reality and the policy maker helps the scientist to understand how 
that causal complexity is manifest in particular outcomes.42 
 
The upshot of the preceding discussion is that the distinction between pure and applied 
modes of scientific inquiry has considerable value – all the more so once the implications of 
the relationship between theory and practice are understood. Because we often employ both 
modes of inquiry when investigating concrete phenomena, it may appear as if the distinction 
between the two is of little consequence. However, it is important to understand both the 
distinction and the connection between the abstract and concrete for the reasons just 
elaborated.  
 
 
4. Postdisciplinarity? 
 
I suggested above that the influence of pragmatism and interpretivism in Byrne’s thinking 
leads him to deny that the distinction between pure and applied social science is of any value. 
I also want to suggest that Byrne’s questioning of this distinction may stem from his forming 
an identity between pure science and what he calls ‘discipline-based’ or ‘disciplinary science’ 
(p. 4), which is the implicit contrast for his forming an identity between applied social science 
and ‘postdisciplinary’ work: 
 
we can see applied social research as it is done by all disciplines and fields and wherever it is based 
in terms of departmental identity as generally postdisciplinary. That is to say, geographers, health 
studies people, sociologists, educationalists and so on do not do applied social research in any 
discipline- or field-distinctive fashion. (p. 185) 
 
These identity relationships are illicit because the basis for ‘disciplinary science’ may be either 
pure or applied science. Why is this? In referring to the disciplining of scientific activity we are 
referring to the necessary effect of the underlying social system of knowledge production; 
therefore, how this system works will determine whether the basis for the disciplining of 
scientists is pure or applied work. Indeed, in claiming that ‘[p]ostdisciplinary work in effect 
returns to the original position of the human sciences before the development of disciplinary 
boundaries and academic and intellectual empires’ (p. 178) Byrne appears to acknowledge, 
implicitly, the underlying conditions for scientific activity. Byrne also appears to acknowledge 
the existence of these conditions in his discussion of 'the pernicious influence of the UK's 
research assessment exercises'. In recognizing that research funding and peer review 
mechanisms are interconnected through the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) – now the 
Research Excellence Framework (REF) – and that 'the RAE process has operated to the 
disadvantage of all of interdisciplinary work, applied work and work which relates to 
professional practice', Byrne is appealing implicitly to the effect of an underlying set of social 
structures (p. 187). Moreover, in his discussion of a British Academy report on social science 
and public policy making Byrne takes note of one of the report's statements, 'that policy 
makers want research findings that … support existing ideologies and are uncontentious',43 
and concludes that '[w]hat is required from applied social science is work which accords with 
                                                          
42 Danermark 2002, 62. 
43 British Academy 2008, 3. 
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the hegemonic status quo' (p. 180). In drawing this conclusion, Byrne acknowledges – again 
implicitly – the pre-existing ideological context in which scientific inquiry is embedded.44 
 
Nevertheless, in arguing that concrete fields of science such as urban and health studies have 
become ‘postdisciplinary’ Byrne reveals, I suggest, the much greater strength of positivism in 
his thinking. On the one hand the influence of positivism undercuts the (implicit) 
transcendental realist conception of the disciplining of scientific activity through the social 
system of knowledge production and leads him to conceive of the present tendency towards 
scientific specialization as a fixed, universal, regularity; on the other hand the strength of the 
influence of positivism – acting most probably in conjunction with interpretivism (the 
dialectical counterpart of positivism) – leads Byrne to see applied scientific fields such as 
urban and health studies as devoid of any materially-based structuring so that, in effect, 
scientists are free to produce whatever form of knowledge they choose – whether this is 
called ‘postdisciplinary’ or something else. It may be the case that applied fields of science 
such as urban and health studies tend not to be practised within their own academic 
departments. However, the fact that these fields of scientific inquiry exist and continue to be 
reproduced suggests that the scientists working in them are disciplined just as much as those 
working in pure fields. In other words, the reproduction of applied fields of science would not 
be possible without an underlying context of social structures and intellectual forms; for, 
whether one is working in an abstract field (such as political science), a concrete field (such 
as urban studies), or an intermediate concrete field (such as economic history), the academic 
expectations of scientific elites – in a context in which scientific specialization is the dominant 
tendency – will be largely the same: to produce scientific work that can be identified as 
                                                          
44 In acknowledging the influence of underlying intellectual forces on the sort of knowledge that social scientists 
produce, Byrne touches on an important relationship – that between social science and society. His point about 
the 'politicized' nature of social research – the way in which applied social science enters public debate through 
'the selective use of research findings to assert that policies have worked' (p. 5) – also touches on this 
relationship: specifically, the interdependence of social science and society, where the maintenance of a 
particular organization of society – one dominated by capitalist relations of production and appropriation – 
depends on the production of positivist-inspired social science (because positivist knowledge obscures the 
reality of underlying social structures and hence the basis for radical social transformation), and where the 
continuation of social science depends on the material resources that society provides. Byrne appears to have 
overlooked the significance of this relationship. For example, in chapter nine of Applying Social Science he asks: 
 
Why … did … the UK ESRC and the AcSS Commission attach so much value to competency in complex 
modelling and mathematical deductive procedures that the second argued for higher rates of grant for PhD 
students working in that mode, and the first accepted this argument and constantly demands ever greater 
levels of mathematical sophistication across the social sciences as a whole? (p. 183) 
 
Byrne's answer turns on the relative level of functional innumeracy of UK social science undergraduates. There 
may well be some truth in this. However, a deeper explanation, surely, must look to the influence of dominant, 
taken-for-granted irrealist forms of thought within society – especially positivism. These forms of thought are 
the pre-conditions for the funding of the majority of social research and help to explain the fetishization of 
quantitative social science and mathematical modelling among higher education research funders and policy 
makers. Because social scientists depend on society for material resources, society can influence the sort of 
knowledge that social scientists produce; and because society depends on social scientists to produce knowledge 
of it, social scientists can influence how those outside the scientific community understand the nature of society. 
(The entry of social scientific research findings into public debate via the media and the employment of social 
science graduates in non-academic professions, such as the civil service, are two important ways in which social 
science affects society.) In short, the relationship between social science and society is one of causal interaction 
as well as causal interdependence. See Holland 2013, ch. 5 for a full discussion of this important relationship. 
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belonging to a particular field of inquiry and can be evaluated by experts working in that field. 
Of course, what signals in part the identity of the work scientists produce is the type of journal 
that they publish it in. But, to talk about journal publication and peer review is to invoke all 
the other social structures that make up the social system of knowledge production – and the 
ideas that constitute the intellectual system – by virtue of which scientific fields, whether pure 
or applied, are reproduced.45  
 
Further evidence in support of my argument that Byrne’s thinking about the nature of science 
is infected by the dual influence of positivism and interpretivism are his claims that ‘the actual 
way the research is done bears little relationship to the actual discipline or field label of those 
doing it’ and that ‘the actual nominal classification of those doing it [applied work] has almost 
no influence on how it is done’ – claims apparently motivated by his observation that applied 
social scientists draw on ‘the whole repertoire of social research techniques’ (pp. 185–6). Yet, 
many fields of science that Byrne would not classify as ‘postdisciplinary’ are just as 
methodologically diverse as applied fields such as urban studies. Political science is one 
example.46 Moreover, Byrne also seems to be suggesting that the classification of fields of 
scientific inquiry has no real basis – that there is no relationship between the ‘nominal 
classification’ of scientific fields and the ways of working within them. The implication of this 
line of thought, which betrays the influence of the philosophical position of conventionalism, 
is that the label ‘urban studies’, for example, is just that – a label – and not an attempt to 
express, however fallibly, the truth about the nature of a concrete object of inquiry – in this 
case, the urban environment. I doubt that Byrne would want to accept such an interpretation 
of the classification of scientific fields but that is the outcome of the influence of irrealism in 
his thinking; for the empirical realist and conceptual realist ontology implicit in positivism and 
interpretivism respectively makes it very difficult for us to understand both vertical and 
horizontal ontological depth, which is the real basis for the differentiation (and integration) 
of scientific fields. This implies that the labels we use to define scientific fields – ‘political’, 
‘economic’, ‘sociological’, ‘geographical’ and so on – have a real reference point (that is, an 
intransitive object of inquiry) and that such labels may have to be revised, and new ones 
added, as our knowledge of reality develops (the principle of epistemological relativism). A 
positivist conception of science, therefore, cannot sustain a coherent distinction between 
pure and applied forms of science because it cannot justify either scientific differentiation – 
the rationale for pure science – or scientific integration – the rationale for applied science. 
With a positivist conception of science in mind, it is not surprising that Byrne should deny that 
the distinction between pure and applied social science is of any value.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this review essay I have evaluated David Byrne’s philosophical position as set out in three 
of his books: Applying Social Science, Interpreting Quantitative Data, and Complexity Theory 
and the Social Sciences. Byrne professes to have developed a philosophical position of 
complex realism – a marriage of complexity theory and critical realism – in conjunction with 
a critique of positivist-inspired statistical modelling and measurement and a questioning of 
                                                          
45 For a full exposition of this argument see Holland 2013, chs 3, 4, and 5. 
46 The methodological diversity of political science is discussed in comparison with the methodological position 
of economics in Holland 2013, ch. 4. 
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the traditional distinction between pure and applied scientific inquiry. However, I have argued 
that Byrne’s actual philosophical position is characterized by a series of contradictions, 
manifest in  
 
(a) a misunderstanding of some of the key principles of critical realism – most notably, the 
relationship between the three domains of reality and between the intransitive and 
transitive dimensions of science; 
(b) a tendency to commit the empirical fallacy when reflecting on the nature of measurement 
in social science; 
(c) confusion about the location of complexity in his proposals for quantitative modelling of 
the complexity of social reality; 
(d) an ambivalent understanding of simplification in (social) scientific inquiry; 
(e) confusion about the ontological status of variables and traces of reality in statistical 
modelling; 
(f) a denial of the validity of distinguishing between pure and applied modes of (social) 
scientific inquiry and thus a denial of the real grounds for the differentiation and 
integration of science. 
 
I have argued that these contradictions are symptomatic of the residual influence of various 
forms of irrealism in his thinking – principally, positivism, interpretivism, and pragmatism. 
Therefore, I suggest that, before Byrne elaborates further on the nature of a complex realist 
(social) ontology, he should clarify his understanding of the principles of original and 
dialectical critical realism – at least if he wants to claim the badge of theoretical consistency. 
Doing so will help him to define a clear methodological position that is consistent with an 
ontology of complex realism and  that can accommodate the integration of quantitative and 
qualitative modes of social scientific inquiry, as well as to specify the exact nature of the 
components of complex social systems and their modes of articulation. 
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